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Abstract
Combining a radical revision of the historical formation of occidental law with per-
spectives derived from decolonial thought, this paper advances a deconstruction of 
occidental law. That deconstruction is then brought to bear on human rights. Al-
though occidental law and human rights are shown in this way to be imperial in 
orientation, that same deconstruction reveals resistant elements in law and in human 
rights. These are elements which the decolonial can draw on in its commitment to 
intercultural transformation.
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Resumo
Combinando uma revisão radical da formação histórica do direito ocidental com 
perspectivas derivadas do pensamento descolonial, este trabalho propõe uma des-
construção do direito ocidental. Essa desconstrução é exercida sobre os direitos 
humanos. Embora a lei ocidental e os direitos humanos sejam mostrados em um 
modo de ser imperial na orientação, essa mesma desconstrução revela elementos re-
sistentes de direito e de direitos humanos. Estes são elementos que a descolonização 
pode traçar em seu compromisso com a transformação intercultural.
Palavras-chave: direitos humanos, pós-colonialismo, descolonização.
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‘Let us return to the past,’ wrote Verdi – but 
unfortunately did not set it to music –, ‘that would be 
progress’ (1971, p. 169). That proposition would for 
many be perverse. The past is where we progress from, 
not to. Progress is something we are always coming to, 
even committed to. Its indefi nite but tentacular telos ori-
ents, even directs, the condition of our being-together. 
Just who this ‘we’, this ‘our’, may be is debatable but its 
range is not confi ned to ‘the West’, to the Occident. And 
I hear there is a country which has as its motto ‘Order 
and Progress’.
The ‘decolonial’ would incline us otherwise, at 
least as a fi rst and essential step. The posited past here 
would be the Hispanic colonization of South and Cen-
tral America, something taken as an origin of a modern 
imperialized world – an origin of what and who is to 
be included in predominance and what and who is ex-
cluded. Like any claim to an historically set origin, this 
one is impossibly exclusive, but it will serve to set this 
impelling decolonial tying of modernity integrally to ‘co-
loniality’. The fusion of these provides the founding force 
of modern occidental imperialism. Let me just take for 
now one depiction of this imperialism and of the incipi-
ent resistance to it to be found in the decolonial. José 
María Arguedas sets the fi rst chapter of his Deep Rivers 
(1978 [1958]) in Cusco, once the capital of the Inca Em-
pire. In a sense, what embeds the whole novel here are 
the stones, the stones of what were once Inca buildings 
and walls in Cusco but which have now been built on 
by the colonists. The stones are both foundational of, 
yet subordinated to, imperial structures. But the same 
stones are radiant. They seethe, they move, talk, frolic. 
Their streets fl ow like rivers, deep rivers, rivers akin 
to primordial serpents. This foundational fusion with 
movement and change is later aligned in the novel with 
Indigenous rebellions, with a primal or abyssal capacity 
to sweep away the existent, to sweep it away in a fl ood, 
a fl ood of rivers (chapters 7 and 11).
There is a seeming tendency for decolonial 
agendas to be more anodyne and to advance the resist-
ant perspectives and action of the excluded in a rela-
tion of plurality to the occidental modern – a relation 
which, according to Mignolo, would recognise that the 
‘Eurocentered narrative,’ of this occidental modernity, 
‘of course, has its right to exist, since it corresponds 
with the experience of Euro-American histories, but it 
does not have the right to be the narrative for the rest 
of the world, except in its imperial/colonial dimensions’ 
(Mignolo, 2013, p. 19). Yet for there to be a plurality, for 
entities to relate plurally, there has also to be some 
commonality between them. One scenario was semi-
nally sketched by Quijano in fi nding that:
First of all, epistemological decolonization, as decolo-
niality, is needed to clear the way for new intercultu-
ral communication, for an interchange of experiences 
and meanings, as the basis of another rationality which 
may legitimately pretend to some universality. Nothing 
is less rational [...] than the pretension that the speci-
fi c cosmic vision of a particular ethnie should be taken 
as universal rationality, even if such an ethnie is called 
Western Europe because this is actually [to] pretend 
to impose a provincialism as universalism (2007, p. 177).
What this imports is something rather more 
unsettling of ‘the Eurocentred narrative’ – something 
that portends the primal dissolution envisaged by Ar-
guedas with his Indigenous rebellions, a not unfamiliar 
scenario in Indigenous literatures. To ‘provincialize Eu-
rope’, adapting also Chakrabarty’s (2000) stunning title, 
would entail not only the denial of universality but also 
a denial of the exclusion on which it is founded, an ex-
clusion embedded, as Mignolo puts it, in the supposed 
‘superiority of Christians and then of the whites’ (2013, 
p. 13). That would be constituently challenging enou-
gh, but there has to be more. Making a proprietary or 
exemplary claim to the universal as an ontological com-
pleteness obviously excludes those that do not conform 
to the terms of membership, but as universal the claim 
must also include them in some way.
The colonized and the enslaved were essential 
to various imperial designs. One which became widely 
accepted came from Francisco de Vitoria especially in 
his lectures De Indis (1991, p. 233 ff.).2 Vitoria drew on 
the inclusive, universal reach of scholastic natural law 
which he aligned with the ius gentium of Roman Law: 
‘the law of nations (ius gentium) [...] either is or derives 
from natural law, as defi ned by the jurist: “What natural 
reason has established among all nations is called the 
‘law of nations’” (Vitoria, 1991, p. 278). The fact that 
‘the jurist’ is unnamed and that no source is given for 
the text, which is from the Institutes of Gaius, indicates 
just how intimate, just how ‘natural’, this linking was for 
Vitoria’s audience in Salamanca – this linking of the ius 
gentium and a Christianized natural law. And for Vitoria 
this ius gentium included another category of Roman 
Law, the ius inter gentes, the law governing relations be-
tween different peoples, different nations (Stein, 1999, 
p. 94-95). 
2 A more extensive account can be found in Fitzpatrick (2009).
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Unlike the more predatory and murderous of 
his compatriots, for Vitoria the colonized ‘Indians’ of 
‘the New World’ had affective abilities and subsisted wi-
thin the range of the ius gentium, as befi ts the all-inclu-
siveness of the universal. By virtue of being human and 
thence possessed of reason, the Indians had dominium; 
or in other words they had a mastery of property and 
a mastery of rule evidenced by their modes of living in 
some similarity to those of the Spanish (Vitoria, 1991, 
p. 239-250). These same Indians however were also di-
fferent to the Spanish, being affl icted with certain gross 
behaviours which they were to overcome. These defects 
serve to ensure the effi cacy of imperial rule when com-
bined with ways of acquiring ‘just title’ provided also by 
the same obliging ius gentium – ways formulated by Vi-
toria so as to identify ‘the legitimate titles by which the 
barbarians could have been subjected to Christian rule’ 
(Vitoria, 1991, p. 252). He emphasised two of these. The 
fi rst emanated from a right to trade, to travel and to 
dwell in the countries of the barbarians – a universal 
right of course and a right extending beyond trade nar-
rowly conceived to include intercourse and communi-
cation generally (Vitoria, 1991, p. 278-284). The second 
was a right to proselytize: ‘Christians have the right to 
preach and announce the Gospel in the lands of the 
barbarians’ and that even against their will, conversion 
being ‘necessary for their own salvation’ with the bar-
barians being ‘obliged to accept the faith’ if it were ade-
quately presented to them (1991, p. 271, 284-285). This 
right provides the limit-case where the assumed univer-
sality of a Christianized ius gentium breaks down. The 
whole of De Indis is a ‘refl ection’ on the injunction in 
Matthew (28-19): ‘Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, 
baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the 
Son, and of the Holy Ghost’ (see Vitoria, 1991, p. 233). 
And as Schmitt tersely put it: ‘It never occurred to the 
Spanish monk that non-believers should have the same 
rights of propaganda and intervention for their idolatry 
and religious fallacies as Spanish Christians had for their 
Christian missions’ (2003, p. 113). 
The barbari being often found resistant to these 
‘particular’ rights, ‘it becomes lawful’ for the Spaniards 
‘to do everything necessary to the aim of war’ to ensure 
compliance; territorial acquisition by conquest ensued 
even to the point of the elimination in this ‘just war’ 
of those who resisted, and Spain’s imperial domination 
could continue with at best marginal adjustments (Vito-
ria, 1991, p. 280-283, 185-186, 291-292). So, the barba-
rians were not only included but were also in a condi-
tion of primal exclusion. That condition was confi rmed 
in terms that even then were far from original and which 
were to become more pervasive with the emergence 
of imperial racisms. So, Vitoria found the barbarians to 
be undeserving of full inclusion because they were like 
madmen or children, cannibalistic, sexually perverted 
and culinarily outrageous, and well neigh impervious to 
a reforming natural reason (1991, p. 207-30, 290-291; 
and see also Pagden, 2003, p. 86-91, 100-103). 
In all, we have in place what could be seen as inci-
pient human rights. From the mixture of natural and Ro-
man law there is a notion of rights that are enforceable 
as such and derive content from a ‘universal’ natural law 
that is, borrowing Quijano’s terms, ‘the specifi c cosmic 
vision of a particular ethnie’ (2007, p. 177).
Vitoria’s colonial template accommodated also 
the shift from a Christianized to a secular, or suppose-
dly secular, imperium. Whilst still being a dedicated Ca-
tholic theologian and churchman, Vitoria still managed 
somehow to reject various papal dictates to do with 
the colonization of the Americas and the division of 
the world. In rejecting the authority of the head of the 
‘universal’ church, and even though the rejection was 
founded on the ius gentium, Vitoria aligned the imperial 
mission with the proto-nationalist Spanish empire by 
way of the Kingdom of Castile and Aragon, the claims 
to a national sovereignty being underlined by Vitoria’s 
invoking here Aristotle’s conception of ‘the perfect 
community’, such perfection involving being ‘complete 
in itself ’ (1991, p. 301).
This shift or emerging shift from ‘the superiori-
ty of Christians and then [to that] of the whites’, again 
borrowing Mignolo’s abbreviated version (2013, p. 13), 
may seem like more of the same. Vitoria’s ‘human’ with 
its universal ius could match the idea of the unity of 
the species in racist discourse. That sets an inescapable 
problem. How can unity be also a fundamental, a total 
division. But it is the very preservation of the universali-
zed ‘purity’ of the species that requires division, that re-
quires dividing the pure from the impure, the exemplar 
from the deviant, the normal from the abnormal. Indeed, 
as Foucault would add, division is somehow primary: 
‘[t]hat is the fi rst function of racism: to fragment, to cre-
ate caesuras within the biological continuum [...]’ (2003, 
p. 255). Overwhelmingly, Foucault identifi ed racism with 
a ‘State racism’ (2003, p. 239 ff.). This was and is a racism 
the ‘activation’ of which stems from the persistence 
of ‘the old sovereign power’ in its ‘national universali-
ty’ (2003, p. 239). ‘State racism’ became ‘the basic me-
chanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States’ 
(2003, p. 254). Such a state, national and imperial, in the 
assumption of universality takes on a position of trans-
cendence. Its appropriated sovereignty, in its ‘unlimited 
and unconditional power’, Derrida found to be a ‘theo-
logic’, something that ‘remains a theological inheritance 
Fitzpatrick | The revolutionary past: Decolonizing Law and Human Rights
100 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 5(2):97-105
that has not really been secularized’ (2005, p. 105, 107, 
118). To take a provincial instance almost in passing, the-
re is James Pelikan’s aperçu: ‘The business of America 
[meaning the United States] may be business as Calvin 
Coolidge once said, but it is at least as accurate and as 
important to assert that the religion of America is Ame-
rica’ (Pelikan, 1971, p. 35).
A considerable problem ensues. The continuity 
from a monotheistic Christianity to a modernity, to this 
one particular modernity, is incompatible with that mo-
dernity – or at least incompatible with its constituent 
claim to be able to account for itself entirely and in ter-
ms of an immanent secularity, and to be able to act in 
those same terms. All of which is starkly incompatible 
with a resort to transcendent determination – or at le-
ast incompatible with determination by way of a positive 
transcendence.
There was, however, a fateful alternative. Instead 
of a positive reference, a negative universal reference 
was and is resorted to and the intimations of it were 
already at the core of a Christianized imperialism. A 
Christianized humanity corresponds to the unity of the 
species characterizing racism. But both were a prelude 
to and force of division. And with the negative universal 
reference, division is the more stark. The entity eleva-
ted in negation becomes what certain alterities, certain 
‘others’, are not. Or it becomes not what certain al-
terities are. Being ‘purely’ negative and being universal, 
the division and exclusion are complete. What is beyond 
the universal can only be utterly beyond. Hence there 
is racism and the irreducible alterity of the relegated 
race. Yet that very appropriation of a universality has, as 
universal, ‘also’ to be all-inclusive. So the negative univer-
sal reference generates an antithesis but then includes 
that antithesis with-in itself. The now-included take on 
an operative part with-in the universal scheme whilst 
still being excluded from it. There is a consistency to 
this. Whilst the exclusion in its completeness is an utter 
denial of independent being, so also is the completeness 
of the inclusion. To resolve, in a way, what is still for them 
an impossible positioning, the excluded are required in 
an entirely conformist way to progress, or reform, or in 
some other way achieve full inclusion. Like the Christian 
‘salvation’, this achievement is necessarily indefi nite. 
Here we should return to Foucault, if too brie-
fl y.3 His idea of racism was an expansive one. The idea 
and its operation are integral to the pervasive conjunc-
tion of biopower and disciplinary normalization as Fou-
cault conceived of them. And to his instances of the-
se we should, along with Escobar, add the verities of 
‘development’ and the ‘abnormalities’ they proscribe as 
well as the ‘normalization’ they prescribe (1984, p. 387, 
388-389), to say nothing of the innumerable disciplina-
ry imperatives issued as ‘structural adjustment’, ‘condi-
tionalities’, ‘poverty reduction strategies’, requirements 
attached to trade, aid and debt relief, and programmes 
installing the rule of law in conjunction with measures 
of security and counter-terrorism – the list could go on. 
As with the negative universal reference of racism ‘pro-
per’, biopower and discipline created the ‘abnormal’, the 
‘anomaly’, the deviant, and these provide the formative 
force of the normal and the conforming (e.g. Foucault, 
1979, p. 229). The abnormal and such are both ‘interior 
and foreign’, subjected to ‘an inclusion through exclu-
sion’ (Foucault, 1970, p. xxiv, 2001, p. 78).
Finally, we come to the culminating stage in the 
advance of the negative universal reference. In its ne-
gativity, such a reference erects no enduringly positive 
bounds. Not only does this make possible the illimitabi-
lity of biopower and a disciplinary power, its exclusions 
are likewise uncontainable. So, the abnormal is not con-
fi ned to the abnormal. Barbarism is not confi ned to the 
barbarian, and so on. ‘We’ are all prone to regress and 
sin, and we have to be incessantly on guard against it and 
ever enhancing of virtue.
It is time to say, belatedly, something of what I 
am trying to do. It is often easier, and convenient, to 
say what you were trying to do once you have done it. 
The story so far, combined with the occasion on whi-
ch it is being told, would suggest that I am positioning 
the narrative in a way that will prove critical, negatively 
critical, of human rights as the successor to the ius gen-
tium and natural law (merging later into natural rights). 
That may turn out to be so, if not entirely so, but a 
more oblique positioning has also been going on, one to 
do with another focal concern of this symposium, ‘de-
colonial thinking’. This positioning does not involve any 
objection to the concerns of such thinking. I would like 
to think of these as my own concerns if they can be so 
shared. But my immediate problem is with the contrary 
tendencies in decolonial thinking. By way of exploring 
these tendencies, we may come to envisage a decoloni-
zing of the West and in the process begin to envisage a 
different law and different human rights.
Back to the beginning. We saw that the deco-
lonial espoused what Mignolo refers to as a ‘delinking’ 
(2007, p. 453), a setting apart from the universalizing 
pretension of an Occident that would encompass and 
3 A more detailed engagement can be found in Fitzpatrick (2013).
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represent the other, not only to determine the condi-
tions of relation to the other but also to determine the 
other’s very being and in the process to contain it within 
certain delimiting categories. The separation sought is 
not complete, and it could hardly be so.  What is invol-
ved is said to be, rather, a relation of plurality. Consistent 
with this plural relation, and as we saw, for Mignolo the 
‘Eurocentred narrative’ of an occidental modernity ‘of 
course, has its right to exist since it corresponds with 
the experience of Euro-American histories, but it does 
not have the right to be the narrative for the rest of the 
world, except in its imperial/colonial dimensions’ (2013, 
p. 19). But what if those dimensions were indistinguisha-
ble from the narrative as a whole? And would not the 
decolonial concern to link coloniality and modernity at 
least suggest such an indistinction? And would not the 
indistinction be confi rmed in the generative range of the 
negative universal reference? And if an occidental mo-
dernity so constituted had now and instead to exist in 
a responsive relation of plurality, what would be left of 
its ‘Eurocentred narrative’? Aptly enough: nothing. In the 
result, the pluralism of decolonial thinking would lead us 
to the revolutionary scenario of Arguedas’s Deep Rivers 
and a sweeping away of imperial dominations.
Perhaps being in a plural relation with a refrac-
tory occidental modernity has led to decolonial thinking 
becoming somewhat infected by it. Whilst the coloni-
zation of South and Central America was signifi cantly 
formative of what became an occidental modernity, it is 
saying too much to assert with Quijano and Wallerstein, 
along with many others to the same effect, that
The modern world-system was born in the long six-
teenth century. The Americas as a geosocial construct 
were born in the long sixteenth century. The creation 
of this geosocial entity, the Americas, was the consti-
tutive act of the modern world-system (1992, p. 549).
From where could we pronounce so confi dently 
and completely on the situated origin of ‘the modern 
world-system’ if not from a position beyond the world – 
from a position adopting the universal comprehension, a 
quasi-transcendence of the same kind as that arrogated 
by an occidental modernity? By way of a sharp contrast, 
the decolonial is often situated on its side of the plura-
lity as intensely ‘local’ with some pointed emphasis on 
‘Indigenous’ groupings (e.g. Mignolo, 2013, p. 21). And 
would it be too mischievous to suggest that the deco-
lonial shares the occidental orientation towards cons-
tituting itself negatively – specifi cally, in an opposition 
to postcolonialism? This ‘darker side’ of the decolonial 
would chastise postcolonialism for being confi ned to 
the academy, too reliant on Western intellectuals, and 
concerned largely with the West (e.g. Mignolo, 2007, 
p. 452, 463). By way of a happy acceptance of these cri-
ticisms of postcolonialism, I will now short circuit much 
of them by bringing a postcolonial perspective to bear 
on the Occident itself and in a way that I hope would 
be seen as empathetic with the decolonial, the exercise 
being one oriented towards a decolonizing of the West.
This is where we come, at last, to Verdi’s return 
to the past, a return which can prove as revolutionary 
as the insurgent deep rivers of Arguedas. In a resolutely 
postcolonial vein, I shall set this return in an occidental 
academic engagement but one that seeks to integra-
te prime decolonial concerns (see e.g. Mignolo, 1995, 
p. 327-329). The modern Occident’s negative universal 
reference in its very universality negates its own past 
and generates itself in a constituent rejection of that 
past – a rejection, an exclusion, which is also and inevi-
tably an inclusion, this included past being one beyond 
which the modern has progressed, and continues to 
progress ad infi nitum. Let me now set that abrupt sy-
nopsis in the academic engagement promised.
 This particular engagement involves the intense 
concern of late with historical periodization, a concern 
which has been most conspicuous in scholarly resis-
tance to the relegating of a medieval age which thence 
provides the constituent contrast to a modern age (e.g. 
Cole and Vance Smith, 2010). What is entailed in that 
relegation is the invention, an ‘imposition’, of an encap-
sulated age against which a modern age is putatively set 
– not just a supposedly status-ridden, oppressive medie-
val or feudal age but also the like attributions to various 
‘non-Christian’, barbaric or savage peoples excluded 
from a universalized civility (Fasolt, 2004, p. 18-19, 219). 
In the process these periodized oppositions, or stran-
ds of them, can become blended. The medieval and the 
religious will usually be packaged together for example. 
And periodized oppositions can also be part of or fused 
with other venerable expedients. So, progressivist and 
teleological histories will typically operate as sequenced 
or streamed periodizations.
 In all and to borrow from Kathleen Davis’s sea-
ring analysis, periodization ‘results from a double move-
ment: the fi rst, a contestatory process of identifi cation 
with an epoch, the categories of which it simultaneou-
sly constitutes [...]; and the second a rejection of that 
epoch identifi ed in this reduced, condensed form [...]’ 
(2008, p. 30-31, her emphasis). In this way modernity is 
‘defi ned...toward the Middle Ages’, a period it ‘will ne-
ver let go’ (Cole and Vance Smith, 2010, p. 24, their em-
phasis). In sum, the defi nition entails the invention of an 
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encapsulated age as modernity’s constituent alterity. 
And that invention, Kathleen Davis again, does not in-
volve ‘simply the drawing of an arbitrary line through 
time, but a complex process of conceptualizing catego-
ries which are posited as homogenous and retroactively 
validated by the designation of a period divide’ (2008, 
p. 3). The division is not simply found. It is made. And it is 
not (only) a complete division. It is ‘also’ an inclusion – a 
remaking, a reinvention and thence an inclusion.
To effect such homogeneity periodization assu-
mes an all-encompassing ontological comprehension, 
one which relegates other conditions to a contained 
historical specifi city. So, for Davis, the ‘secularization’ 
conceived in opposition to the ‘religious’ Middle Ages 
‘turns political difference into temporal distance’ the-
reby setting apart the religious as ‘spiritual’ and relega-
ting anything political about it to a terminal past (2008, 
p. 133). This manoeuvre enables ‘the sublimation of the-
ology in the “world”’ (Davis, 2008, p. 84), a theology whi-
ch embeds various deifi c substitutes in and as moderni-
ty. For example and as we saw, it embeds a sovereignty 
which Derrida often found, in its ‘unlimited and uncon-
ditional powers’, to be a ‘theo-logic’, something that ‘re-
mains a theological inheritance that has not really been 
secularized’ (2005, p. 105, 107, 118). The intrinsic claim 
of a modern sovereignty to this ‘secular’ transcendence 
results in its unsettled relation to law, to a rule of law. 
Law of a supposedly pre-modern, of a medieval, 
variety joined the medieval itself in being fi ctively recast 
and contained and thence relegated as the polar oppo-
site of a surpassing modern age and its enlightened law. 
‘Feudal’ is the label applied in this standard periodized 
relegation of law. Feudal law, in this rendition, is a law es-
sentially compromised in its being an entirely compliant 
instrument for exercising power over the comprehen-
sively subjected, and as such it retrospectively comes 
to provide the characteristics of a whole society or era 
(see Berman, 1983, p. 295). All of which is to ignore the 
diversity and the wide generative range of the ‘feudal’ 
both generally and when it comes to law (Ryan, 2010, 
p. 509). And it is to sidestep the quality of the relation 
of law to ruling powers, a relation that went far beyond 
being merely subordinate to them, and a relation that 
would undermine the standard modern notion of law 
as a product of sovereign assertion were not law sub-
sumed in an irredeemable medieval ‘age’. Typically, the 
power of the prince was more attenuated than that in-
vested in modern sovereignties. And law was typically 
incapable of being contained within the power of the 
prince. Medieval law was seen as utterly pervading the 
social: law ‘became the most crucial and vital element of 
the whole social fabric’ (Ullman, 1975, p. 28). And that 
‘fabric’ included ‘governmental principles and ideology’ 
(Ullman, 1975, p. 28). And this has been seen as a rule 
of law of ‘a far wider scope and framework than [...] its 
modern successor’ (Ullman, 1975, p. 28). Yet, a seeming 
contradiction: the law was also seen as dependent on 
other elements of a medieval sociality. Law could not, to 
take a conspicuous example, ‘contradict divine law’ and 
its derived contents were oriented in terms of Chris-
tian beliefs. Yet further: this same law was also ascribed 
‘secular’ qualities that set it apart from any such endow-
ment and preserved its unifying coherence as law. Con-
tradiction now compounded: this same unifying entity is 
characteristically described in ‘modern’ jurisprudential 
scholarship as a ‘jumble of different sorts of law’ and as 
hardly deserving the name ‘legal’ at all (Tamanaha, 2008, 
p. 377; Donlan, 2011, p. 15).
Far from there being a jumble, Grossi, among 
others, would see law as taking on ‘a unifi ed shape 
throughout the Middle Ages’, see it becoming an ‘inte-
grated plurality’, and see also the legal pluralism of ‘the 
late Middle Ages’ as ‘both unifi ed and, at the same time, 
plural’ (Grossi, 2010, p. 21, 35, 37). Law was the inte-
grating element of the commonality, of the plurality of 
communities embedding the plurality of laws. Law was 
a working of the community of communities.4 Such law 
had to create ‘concepts which are entirely abstract, that 
is, non-existent for human senses’ (Conte, 2012, p. 482- 
483). Yet this same law ‘had a peculiarity [...]: the intellec-
tual process itself of describing in technical vocabulary 
very different experience of real life [...]’ (p. 483). Hence, 
this same unifying law was characterised by ‘openness’, 
by a ‘capacity of absorption’, and in particular it had to 
be adaptable in its capacity to absorb a huge diversity of 
sources of law well beyond the range of the Christian 
and the religious generally (Ullman, 1975, p. 490).
There is a remarkable resemblance between 
this picture of medieval law and postcolonial, as well as 
poststructural, ideas of law generally. Postcolonial law is 
an aporetic combination of law as capable of determi-
nate self-realization and law as ‘abstract’ or vacuous and 
thence infi nitely responsive, the aporia itself being ge-
nerative of law in its singularity (Fitzpatrick and Darian-
Smith, 1999). This law, again like the medieval, is identifi ed 
with and matches the constituent conditions of society 
or community itself (Derrida, 1997, p. 231). With unfor-
givable brevity, these conditions of law and of sociality 
4 This would suggest parallels with the Bolivian constitution of 2009.
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could be mapped onto the idea of the decolonial – the 
decolonial combining as it does the ‘delinking’ of being 
and thought in its fi nitude from the quasi-universality of 
an occidental imperium with a responsive relation of plu-
rality – a ‘pluriverse’ rather than a universe (cf. Mignolo, 
2011, p. 72). In all, and bluntly, law is decolonial. Or, in a 
more restrained vein, in its ability to extend beyond its 
appropriation by an occidental modernity, law is intrinsi-
cally capable of being decolonial. 
Can the same be said of that legal artefact known 
as human rights? Human rights, in a way, pose an ulti-
mate challenge to law and to the decolonial. They claim 
explicitly and foundationally an operative universality 
whilst being, and inevitably being, a particularity. Negati-
ve critiques of human rights on this score are of course 
legion. In its classic mode, this critique would fi nd that 
human rights are based on an at least complicit accep-
tance of Western conceptions of individuality, of respon-
sibility and of social relations. More situated critiques 
would see human rights as giving effect to economic 
hegemonies usually seen as neo-imperial and countless 
instances have been adduced of the ‘promotion’ of hu-
man rights as part of ‘programmes’ of aid and develop-
ment so called. Also, human rights have been shown to 
be constituted and sustained in a sharp and enduring 
division of the peoples of the world. I will provide some 
indications shortly but taking an instance in the interim, 
currently Kenya and the African Union are proposing in 
different ways to withdraw support for the International 
Criminal Court because of a perceived racial bias in its 
prosecutions – international criminal law being concer-
ned considerably with the enforcement of human rights. 
Human rights are also seen as having a weighted history, 
one that continues to endow them with content. So, and 
for instance, Pagden would trace a genealogy of human 
rights to Roman law, and pointedly so with the resort to 
Roman law and the ius gentium in the colonization of the 
Americas, that legacy being sustained in the subsequent 
European adoption of ‘natural rights’ (Pagden, 2003).
This genealogy could be extended, but no mat-
ter how or whether it is brought to bear, human rights 
involve a resort to the natural and to the humanity si-
milar to that evoked by the ius gentium in conjunction 
with natural law. ‘It is [...] impossible’, Fukuyama tells us, 
‘to talk about human rights [...] without having some 
conception of what human beings actually are like as a 
species’ – without some constitution of ‘human nature: 
the species-typical characteristics shared by all human 
beings qua human beings’ (2002, p. 101, 128). Then he 
would add that ‘there is an intimate connection betwe-
en human nature and human notions of rights, justice, 
and morality’ before cautioning that ‘the connection be-
tween human rights and human nature is not clear-cut, 
however’ (Fukuyama, 2002, p. 101). In a more resolutely 
tautological offering, Donnelly tells us that ‘human rights 
are literally the rights one has simply because one is 
a human being’, before going on also to concede un-
certainty (1985, p. 9, 21). The notes of uncertainty are 
certainly understandable. There have, of course, been 
numberless efforts to construct the human in terms of 
essential and distinguishing qualities, not least in relation 
to human rights. None has secured general acceptance, 
perhaps because if ‘we’ take the human to be our en-
compassing essence, there is a problem in being able to 
stand apart from it and thence encompass and know it. 
Hence, going back to the negative universal reference, 
human rights have been more confi dently designated in 
terms not so much of what must be taken but rather 
not taken to be defi nitively human. The human of human 
rights must not be too backward, too traditional, behave 
inhumanly, and so on. But given our inability to encom-
pass the human, the search for it can only be intermi-
nable. The ‘human’ creature that has emerged from this 
search has been a labile one whose confi dent criteria of 
self-identity have come and eventually gone, or assumed 
an irresolute half-life, whether these criteria are espou-
sed as a positive marker of the human or, more typically, 
as its negation, – criteria to do with abnormality, race 
and gender, various corporeal and genetic endowments, 
monstrosity and the sub-human, culture and language, 
rationality and dominium, among others (Bourke, 2011).
All of which hardly bodes well for a ‘positive’ 
conclusion to a talk a focal concern of which has to be 
human rights. Given the account so far, such rights come 
to provide the ultimate instance of the instrumental or 
pragmatic appropriation of law within an occidental 
modernity. So situated, and adapting Robert Williams’ 
description of law in ‘the colonizing discourse of Renais-
sance Spain’, human rights become and are ‘the perfect 
instrument of empire’, of a globalized imperium (1990, 
p. 59). Yet we could now go on to say that human rights 
as the perfect instrument of something are also its ulti-
mate undoing, or even its transformation. 
Intimations of that transformation could be 
found in a multitude of instances where human rights 
have been drawn on effectively in the cause of the op-
pressed. Notably, Upendra Baxi has accommodated such 
instances in a conception of human rights as plurality – a 
plurality made up of ‘resistances and struggles’ against 
the ‘dominant and hegemonic’ position assumed by or 
through a monist, quasi-religious and ‘universal’ human 
rights (2006, p. xv, 23, 26, 47). To take just one exam-
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ple from another source, the Women’s Courts in and 
around Delhi, the Mahila Panchayats, were established 
by women, and this was done quite outside of the for-
mal legal system. Typically, proceedings are taken against 
men for domestic violence or to claim maintenance. As 
well as drawing on ‘local idiom’, there is a general relian-
ce on ‘equitable notions of jurisprudence and women’s 
rights’, and that reliance extends to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, a convention characteristically described as a 
bill of rights for women (Magar, 2001, p. 44, 55).
The obvious response to human rights as plura-
lity is that human rights would have no content beyond 
the distinct and scattered instances of their resistant ap-
plication. But can there not be a ‘beyond’ of a plurality? 
And that would seem to be an impelling question for 
the decolonial also. As we saw when engaging with the 
plurality of the decolonial, any plurality has to have its 
commonality. Without it the entities would not be rela-
ting plurally. There would be a mere dissipation of them. 
Could that commonality, then, import a ‘universality’ of 
the human of human rights – import a turning to one 
(in terms of the etymology of ‘universality’). Perhaps we 
can come to this by making the concern with the nega-
tive a rather more ‘positive’ one. Faced with the utter 
exclusiveness of various occidental regimes – regimes 
of thought and rule such as racist regimes – we could 
assert that humanity is that which cannot be ultimately 
excluded (cf. Boyne, 1990, p. 152-159). 
Now to transpose that assertion to rights, hu-
man rights. Rights are normative claims on the futurity 
of a being-together in community. As such, a right has 
always to be able to transcend any delimitation, always 
able to become other than what it may presently be. 
A right, that is, generatively trajects beyond any con-
tained condition whether temporally or spatially con-
tained. That uncontainment is the impelling element of 
a right’s being ‘general and universal’, of its surpassing 
any specifi city. The human, the humanity of rights, tho-
roughly embeds this responsiveness of rights. Coming 
from within the secular human, the posited community 
of the human, we are not able to occupy some com-
prehension beyond it, to encompass and contain it – to 
decree what its ‘nature’, including its human nature, may 
‘universally’, ever-assuredly be. In the spirit of the deco-
lonial, this perspective would open on to a human rights 
ever beyond ultimate affi rmation, an ever-resistant hu-
man rights. 
A fi ttingly inconclusive conclusion, then. Mini-
mally, we could say, along with Fernández-Armesto and 
his deconstruction of the ‘human’ of human rights, that 
we are left at least with a ‘precious self-dissatisfaction’ 
(2004, p. 170). And whilst nursing that dissatisfaction we 
may, along with Derrida in the company of Nelson Man-
dela, fi nd ‘a law that has not yet presented itself in the 
West, at the Western border, except briefl y, before im-
mediately disappearing’ (Derrida, 1987, p. 38).
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